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China’s Belt and Road Initiative: 
Global Politics and Implications
 
Abstract 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global 
infrastructure development project that 
ambitiously aims to connect Asia with 
European and African continents through 
land and sea corridors. China adopted this 
gigantic game-changing master plan in 
2013 and spurred much speculation 
among scholars and policymakers 
worldwide. This article investigates the 
development of the project through the 
lens of global political geography and 
economy. From an international relations 
perspective, the author consults relevant 
pieces of literature and focuses on the 
international issues and events concerning 
the development of the project using 
concepts of ideas, interests, and 
institutions within the scope of geopolitics 
and political economy. The analysis is 
performed by reviewing critical events 
and arguments related to the ideas, 
interests and institutions evolving around 
the implementation of BRI. Drawing from 
the analysis, the author argues that the rise 
of China as a dominant global superpower 
largely depends on the success of the BRI, 
and this initiative will continue to generate 
politics among the international actors, 
multinational entities, and institutions. 
Despite widespread speculations, the 
project poses a substantive threat to the 
USA’s global dominance and is likely to 
create more global development 
cooperation under Chinese leadership and 
vision.
Subject: International Politics 
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), China, Superpower, Global 
Politics, International Relations
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1.  Introduction 
Following the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) reformed its economic policy in 1978, and since then, its story is 
mostly about the unceasing success of economic growth and market 
expansion. Since 1979 to 2017, China’s real gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10% (Morrison, 2018, p. 1). Due to 
its massive opening-up policy and trade liberalization, the country has become 
the top foreign direct investment (FDI) destination among all developing 
countries and received the highest amount of FDI since its accession to World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Tuan, Ng, & Zhao, 2009). In this 
incredible and unprecedented journey of economic development, the country 
has also lifted 850 million people out of poverty (World Bank, 2019). With a 
population of 1.3 billion China is now the second-largest economy in the world 
with a GDP of 13.4 Trillion USD and has been the single most significant 
contributor to world growth since 2008 (World Bank, 2019). In several 
aspects, the country has already surpassed the largest economy of the world- 
the United States of America (USA). For instance, China is the largest 
exporting nation in the world. Although in terms of Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) China has already become the largest economy in the world, several 
studies suggest that considering the GDP, it will become the largest economy 
of the world by 2030 (Johnson, 2019). China’s economic rise in many ways 
has challenged the existing world economic and political order. Analysts 
believe that the unipolarity of the world led by the USA is coming to an end 
with the rise of China-led economic alliance (Sears, 2016; Vuving, 2012). The 
ongoing trade war between the two largest economies of the world, the USA 
and China, starting from July 2018 has been one of the significant products of 
the superpower rivalry (BBC, 2019). In this context, China’s plan to lead the 
execution of the biggest ever infrastructure project in human history has been 
a subject of enormous interest and scrutiny in the international community.  
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious program to 
connect Asia with Africa and Europe through land and waterways. Since the 
inception of this project in 2013, it has not only made substantive progress but 
also spurred much speculation among scholars and policymakers around the 
world (Sarker, 2019, p. 280). Scholars of various disciplines have studied this 
gigantic game-changing project initiative from multiple perspectives (Xing, 
2019; Lei, 2018). These perspectives largely addressed the bi-lateral and 
regional perspectives; few have explored the implications for international 
politics. The focus remains at the US-China relations. After Donald Trump 
won the US presidential election in 2016 through his promise of ‘Making 
America Great Again’, the momentum of global politics has shifted towards 
China and its ambitious global infrastructure project – the BRI. It is imperative 
to explore the implications of BRI in international politics and development if 
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we want to understand the current trends and future course of the global 
powerplay. Several scholars have assumed that the future impetus of power – 
political and economic – will reside in Asia (Khanna, 2018; Mahbubani, 2018; 
Mahbubani, 2020). However, these arguments largely depend on the political-
economic rivalry between the USA and China in the world. Francis 
Fukuyama, in his most noted article ‘The End of History’ published in 1989 
argued that the last ideological alternative to liberalism perished with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the world would achieve homeostasis 
(Menand, 2018). As Mahbubabi (2020) argues that the emergence of China as 
a global superpower has challenged the primacy of the USA in several critical 
fronts, with the ongoing US-China trade war and the implementation of BRI, 
we are at a crucial time to assess and observe how new this fresh ideological 
war progresses. Exploring implication of the BRI for global politics can pave 
the way of deeper understanding, especially from the developing country 
perspectives.  
In this backdrop, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of 
the BRI in the context of concurrent global politics and development. The 
organization of this paper as follows. After providing a brief description of the 
initiative, we will discuss some of the key concepts making the framework 
through which we will extract international politics in and around the BRI. 
While analyzing the issues, we argue that the rise of China as a dominant 
global superpower largely depends on the success of the BRI, and this 
initiative will continue to generate politics among the international actors, 
multinational entities, and institutions. Despite widespread speculations, BRI 
as a grand infrastructure development project poses a massive threat to the 
USA’s global dominance. It is likely to create more global development 
cooperation under Chinese leadership and vision. 
 
2.  Belt and Road Initiative: a Chinese master plan 
During his state visit to Kazakhstan in October 2013, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping unveiled the One Belt One Road initiative comprising the 
Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Zeng, 
2019). However, Callahan (2016) notes that the idea of BRI was first mooted 
by Wang Jisi (2012), a well-connected IR Scholar, in a Global Times article 
in October 2012. The author argued that since the USA was boxing in the PRC 
to the maritime East with its Asian pivot, China should march West to expand 
economic and security ties with neighbors in Central Asia (Callahan, 2016, p. 
11). In November 2014, the Chinese government officially announced the 
creation of a new Silk Road fund of 40 billion US dollars at the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation meeting in Beijing, followed by the official opening 
of the project in March 2015 through the National Development and Reform 
Commission under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
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Commerce (Aoyama, 2016, p. 5). In March 2015, the Chinese government 
published the ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic 
Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which led the foundation of this 
visionary initiative. The official web portal of BRI describes it as “an initiative 
originated in China, but it belongs to the world; it is rooted in history, but 
oriented toward the future and focuses on Asia, Europe, and Africa, but is open 
to all partners” (PRC, 2019). The project spans numerous countries and 
regions, different stages of development, historical traditions, cultures and 
religions, and different customs and lifestyles. It indicates that although this 
initiative is majorly an infrastructure development project, it has the vision to 
deliver on social, political, and cultural aspects.  
BRI includes 80 countries, mainly from Asia, Europe, and Africa 
encompassing nearly 36% of the global GDP, 68% of the world population, 
and more than 40% of international trade (Islam, 2019). As Aoyama (2016) 
created the following table (table 1) to describe six economic corridors and 
one sea route to be built under this giant initiative. 
Table 1: Land and Sea Corridors Constituting Belt and Road Initiative  
(Source: Aoyama, 2016, p. 6-7) 
1. China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) 
It includes two economic corridors. One starts in northern China, extends through 
Mongolia and Russia while the other starts in northeast China and reaches to Chita 
(Russia). 
2. New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELBEC) 
This route is divided into three parts and connects Liyanyungang province to the Port of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands. This corridor can potentially link Japan, South Korea, Iran, 
Russia, and the EU. 
3. China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCAWEC) 
It starts in the Xinjiang, Uyghur region and extends through the Persian Gulf, and reaches 
the coast of the Mediterranean Sea and the Arab Penninsula. It connects Central Asian 
nations including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as well as Iran and Turkey. 
4. China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC) 
It starts in Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Region and Kunming and ends in Singapore. It 
crosses the South China sea and faces great difficulties in the establishment. 
5. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
It is a 3000-km route connecting Kashgar, Xinjiang Uyghur region with Gwadar Port in 
Pakistan. It has the role in connecting ‘One Belt’ with ‘One Road’. An agreement 
between China and Pakistan to cooperate broadly in areas such as energy, infrastructure, 
and industry. 
6. Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) 
This is to be established together with Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Through this 
corridor, China can promote ties with India and Bangladesh, with which historically did 
not have close ties. 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
It consists of routes from the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to Europe and Africa 
and routes from the South China Sea to the South Pacific. China plans to invest in 15 
international harbour cities as part of this corridor development.  
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Scholars have compared this initiative with the US Marshall Plan in 
1948, which was launched to minimizing the influence of the former Soviet 
Union over the central and eastern European countries (Sabine, 2017). 
However, Boucher (2019) argued that BRI is neither a Chinese version of the 
Marshall Plan nor a new Silk Road, and added that unlike Marshall Plan, BRI 
finances infrastructure projects constructed by the Chinese companies and 
labors. While in the case of the ancient Silk Road case, to Boucher (2019), 
everyone along the way had a stake in the trade while BRI profits mostly go 
to Chinese firms and banks. 
 
Figure 1: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Source: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/) 
 
The above image (figure 1) shows how BRI will facilitate international 
trade routes through  landmass and seaways. In the official opening ceremony 
of BRI held in May 2017, President Xi presented the keynote in the program 
announcing the detailed plans as showed in the image. He also referred it to 
the beginning of a new Chinese Empire like what was built by the Qin and 
completed by the Han Dynasties in Chang’an (Schneider, 2017). It reaffirmed 
that Xi’s foreign policy, as noted by Aoyama (2016), is aimed at the great 
revival of the Chinese People and for achieving the ‘Chinese Dream’. This 
Chinese dream broadly includes the ideas and concepts which President Xi 
mentioned in his book ‘The Governance of China’ (final edition in 2018). 
These ideas and concepts include socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
achieving rejuvenation, broader Chinese leadership in the world, and 
economic development of the people of Chinese and the other countries 
(Peters, 2017; Callahan, 2016). The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is 
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planned to get celebrated in 2049 (the centenary of the foundation of PRC) 
with the successful execution of BRI (Hillman, 2018). 
Popular estimates anticipate that Chinese investment ranging from $1 
trillion to $8 trillion for completing BRI projects (Ho, 2017). There are as 
many as twelve financial institutions that have been providing funds and loans 
to the BRI projects. These institutions are Afro-Asian Economic Council 
(AAEC), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China-CEE Fund, 
China Investment Cooperation (CIC), China Development Bank (CDB), 
China-Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund (CEF), Export-Import Bank of 
China (EXIM), New Development Bank (NDB), Russia-China Investment 
Fund (RCIF), Silk Road Fund (SRF), and State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) (BRI, 2019). The Silk Road Fund and the Asian 
Infrastructure Invest Bank are the two major contributors to the funding. So 
far, the current outlay has around 200 billion USD investments, and President 
Xi claimed that 64 billion-dollar deals had been signed in the second forum of 
BRI (Pao, 2019). However, the funding information on the projects is still not 
fully in public. 
The plans showed in the image illustrate the revival of silk routes 
through the landmass and sea. As per the official description of the initiative, 
there are five main areas of cooperation: (a) policy cooperation, (b) 
Infrastructure Connectivity, (c) Trade and Investment Enhancement, (d) 
Financial Integration, and (e) people-to-people bond. For the last five years, 
the Chinese government has worked to integrate BRI projects and its vision in 
China’s domestic development policies as well as its regional and global 
action plans (BRI, 2019). These policies include the Five-Year Plan of Action 
on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, China`s Arctic Policy, Shaanxi’s Action 
Plan for the Belt and Road Construction, Qinghai’s Development and Action 
Plan of Silk Road Cultural Industrial Belt, and Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank Articles of Agreement.  
Scholars worldwide have observed various kinds of Chinese political 
and economic interests covered inside this so-called infrastructure project. 
Critics have raised several issues and challenges in and around BRI. The USA 
has continuously expressed its concerns and fear over the execution of this 
initiative. Hurley, Morris and Portelance (2018) in their published by a 
Washington-based research organization 'Center of Global Development' 
raised several issues including the risk factors, debt, and lack of transparency. 
The arrangement of the second BRI forum in April 2019 and the participation 
of several leading economies of Europe have kept the USA worried (Reuters, 
May 9, 2019). This article takes a theoretical framework of geopolitical and 
economic concepts to look at the current developments of the projects and the 
issues raised, mainly backed by the US-led allies and institutions. Since this 
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article explores the implications of global politics and development, we shall 
discuss and analyze the issues and dynamics from a macro global perspective.  
 
3. Conceptual framework 
Theories of geopolitics have always been an integral part of the study 
of international relations. The founder of Geopolitics Halford John Mackinder 
placed his famous but controversial ‘Mackinder’s Law’ in 1904, according to 
which – “who controls East Europe, controls Heartland and who controls 
Heartland, rules the world” (Kelly, 2006). From a geopolitical (or political 
geography) perspective, there are two kinds of power – Land Power and Sea 
Power. Understanding geopolitics concerns the geography of international 
politics, particularly the relationship between physical environment (location, 
resources, and territory) and foreign policy (Sprout & Sprout, 1960; Tuathail, 
1992). Geopolitical reasonings can be described as creating a backdrop or 
setting upon which international politics takes place. To Tuathail (1992), this 
view is very simplistic. Kelly (2006) pointed out two distinct versions of 
geopolitics – classical and contemporary critical. Classical theories are a set 
of thoughts by some scholars, including Rudolf Kjellen, Thayer Mahan, 
Halford Mackinder, and Karl Haushofer. Tuithail criticizes classical 
geopolitics and advocates for critical geopolitics, which mainly deals with 
statecrafts and ideas made of practical problem-solving geopolitical strategies.  
The study of political economy relates to the understanding of 
economics and political science together. The international political economy 
deals with political relations between different nation-states in framing their 
respective economic policies, which has primarily been the result of 
globalization and the emergence of a rapidly integrated and interconnected 
world (Timimi, 2010). In International Relations, the states are considered 
individual actors who want to maximize their gain or advantage in competitive 
trade and economic ties. Classical economists, including Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, contributed to the origin of political, financial understanding. 
However, the theory has evolved. Currently, Political Economy Analysis 
(PEA) mainly focuses on the actors, networks, institutions, and their 
competing interests as Hall (1997) identifies the essential useful components 
of a political economy – ideas, interests, and institutions – to explore and 
understand the politics within. The framework developed by Pettit and Acosta 
(2014) explains contemporary PEA and identifies the significance of two 
characteristic features of PEA. First, the analysis of institutions is essential in 
understanding how the social and political institutions shape decisions and 
outcomes and reproduce asymmetries to protect the interests of influential 
actors. Second, the analysis of individuals crucially includes the best interests 
of individuals (or a group of like-minded actors) which could be not only 
material benefits or awards but also common good or behavior within the 
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setting. The absolute and competitive advantage of international trade also 
comes into the analysis of the global political economy.  
Scholars have combined the concepts of geopolitics and international 
political economy while explaining the aggressive Chinese investments in the 
Arctic Region, Africa, and Asia (McDonald & Klasche, 2019; Lei, 2018). 
Luttwak (1990) grounded the origin of this integration of the concepts of 
geopolitics with geo-economics, and argue that understanding the purpose of 
global commerce and economics requires deeper insights of the rules of the 
game among the players. McDonald and Klasche (2019), while analyzing the 
Chinese quest of for resources and control of commercial infrastructure in 
arctic region, emphasize on understanding the dominance of sea routes and the 
advantages come with it. After noting the necessity of geopolitical analysis of 
contemporary geo-economic processes, Moisio (2017) notes that this kind of 
analysis is useful to explain the emerging inter-spatial competition for regional 
and economic expansion of global powers. By connecting these concepts and 
lens, this article develops its analysis by reviewing pertinent pieces of 
literature and reports of the critical events.  
In this paper, we analyze the ideas, interests, and institutions related to 
BRI where the individual actors and stakeholders are the states and 
international (bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global) institutions with the 
framework of geopolitical analysis. Since the objective of the paper is to 
understand global politics in and around Belt and Road development projects, 
this conceptual framework will allow us to explore the implications and 
learning. The following sections categorically present the discussion and 
analysis drawn from the three concepts – ideas, interests, and institutions – 
which will lead us to a summarized presentation of the argument.   
 
4.  BRI as an Idea: not a mere international development project 
The main ideas behind the establishment of Belt and Road 
infrastructures are multi-faceted. In ‘The Governance of China II’ (2018), Xi 
Jinping put together his speeches in a chapter dedicated to the Belt and Road 
Initiative. In his speech on the 8th of November, 2014, he outlined five 
significant ideas behind BRI- (1) the development focus on Asian countries, 
(2) developing a basic framework or master plan of Asian connectivity by 
leveraging economic corridors, (3) harvesting in Asian connectivity by 
making breakthroughs in transport infrastructure, (4) breaking through the 
bottlenecks in Asian connectivity by building a finance platform, and (5) 
social foundation of Asian connectivity promoting people-to-people exchange 
(Jinping, 2017, pp. 543-545). Notably, this initial plan neither includes Europe 
nor Africa, nor Latin America. In the following year he spoke about reviving 
the Maritime Silk Road and the culture of the Silk Road (29 April 2016) while 
on the 17th of August at a conference of BRI, he described eight strategic ideas 
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of how China should approach towards implementing BRI (Jinping, 2017, pp. 
546-553). Eventually, on the 14th of May 2017, Xi presented his vision before 
100 country representatives (including the heads of states and governments). 
His BRI speeches emphasized several things – peace and cooperation, 
openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and benefit, financial interaction, 
friendship with European and African people, trade as a growth engine, 
mutually beneficial business partnerships, and following the root of the 
ancient Silk Road. These measures reflect on an old Chinese saying that he 
mentioned before concluding his speech – “A long journey can be covered 
only by taking one step at a time”. He also quoted a European saying – “Rome 
was not built in a day”. This year-by-year progress indicates a grand idea of 
the Chinese market and economic expansion.     
The question arises – how did the idea of BRI originate? As Callahan 
(2016) argues, “we need to appreciate how Chinese elites view international 
politics, often in terms of domestic ideational debates” (p. 2). He also analyzed 
how realists, liberalists, and constructivists view BRI. Realists see how China 
structurally challenges the United States or Chinese characteristics of 
socialism play a role in capitalist power politics. Liberals oppose that view, 
and by arguing that China does not have the ideas, capacities, and incentives 
to tear down the existing international order while constructivists view the 
case of the Chinese rise in the world as a peaceful and respectful one. Scholars 
have identified domestic politics and the economy as the primary source of 
BRI as an idea. China’s economy was often called the ‘dragon economy’ for 
its consistent growth of 10% for more than three decades (Lin, 2011). 
However, the economy started to slow down in 2012 due to several 
reasons. Zou Lei (2018) analyzes BRI from the Political Economy 
perspectives and notes, “in the 21st century, the rise of China’s manufacturing 
industry not only gives momentum to the miracle of China’s Economy but 
also drives the growth of the whole world…as the global financial and 
European debt crisis worsen, China’s manufacturing-oriented economy has 
become the stabilizer and engine of the world economy” (p. 91). By 2011 the 
output of manufacturing accounted for 19.8% of total world output, surpassing 
the USA’s 19.4% (Lei, 2018, p. 91). But this growth slowed down since 2012 
as the cost of labor started to grow along with the per capita income. Since 
China remained the largest exporter country in the world, the companies were 
under pressure to produce more goods with minimized production costs. It was 
a daunting task for newly elected President Xi in 2013 to steer the economy 
towards a potential journey. In 2015 China released its ten-year plan called 
‘Made in China 2025’ to update China’s manufacturing base by rapidly 
developing ten high-tech industries, including electric cars and other new 
energy vehicles, next-generation information technology (IT) and 
telecommunications, and advanced robotics and artificial intelligence 
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(McBride & Chatzky, 2019). Chinese construction companies are good at 
building things, at home and abroad. National construction companies were 
looking for international bids for employing their capital, labor, and 
machinery. Lenin’s theory of imperialism (Lindsey, 1982) can explain this 
market and business expansion. Laura A. Johnson (2018) noted some critical 
aspects of China’s slowing economy and the implication of BRI as 
international infrastructure projects. Firstly, the member states (or the targeted 
states) all belong to the ‘young and poor’ category of states, meaning that the 
concentration of low and demographically growing economies – those with 
the highest unrealized development potential in Central and South Asia and 
Africa (Johnson, 2018, p. 6).  Secondly, the flow of FDI, both outside to China 
and China to outside countries, could well boost up with such giant 
infrastructure project partnerships. China introduced Peripheral Diplomacy as 
a policy strategy to the abovementioned potentials. The Work Forum on 
Peripheral Diplomacy (2013) and the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs 
(2014) laid the critical stones for China’s fifth-generation leadership. The 
stated purpose of the October 2013 Work Forum was to establish the strategic 
objectives, basic principles, and overall setup of the peripheral diplomatic 
work in the next five-to-ten years (Callahan, 2016, p. 4).  Through these 
measures, the Xi government wanted to strengthen ties with the peripheral 
countries in Central, South and Southeast Asia. President Xi mentioned in the 
speech given at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia (CICA), “the Chinese people, in their pursuit of the Chinese 
dream of great national rejuvenation, stand ready to support and help other 
peoples in Asia to realize their great dreams…let us work together for realizing 
the Asian dream” (Callahan, 2016, p. 7). The idea of proposing a massive 
project like BRI grew in the Chinese leadership, mainly led by Xi Jinping. 
The above analysis of ideas on how ideas evolved around BRI suggests 
that the Chinese expansion both as a land and sea power was at the center of 
these all ideas. 
 
5. Interests of BRI: who gets what 
The political economy analysis mainly deals with the rules of the 
games and who gets what. Understanding the politics in an economy requires 
insights relating to the type of the stakes and the role of their holders. In BRI, 
firstly, the Chinese interest is apparent. The Chinese government seeks to (a) 
create a global market for their goods, (b) sustain the top position as a 
worldwide exporter, especially in the Asia and Europe, (c) fight with the US 
interests in the global market, (d) enhance the influence over the peripheral 
and strategically significant countries (for instance, Djibouti and Sri Lanka), 
(e) create an infrastructure alliance with like-minded countries to counter the 
hegemonic influence of the USA within the current liberal international order, 
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and (f) to raise the value of Yuan as a currency (Authers, 2018). However, the 
most significant interest of China is increasing the volume of trade through the 
proposed six economic corridors.  
The following image shows the size of the GDPs (PPP) of the major 
trading countries in the world. 
 
Figure 2: The Major Economies of the World and Their Sizes (Khanna, 2018) 
 
The above image suggests that China has already become the largest 
economy of the world and is currently the largest trading partner of all major 
countries in Asia. In his latest book titled ‘The Future is Asian’; Khanna 
(2018) argues that China wants to maximize its competitive advantage by 
enhancing the trade volumes through the proposed corridors. That competitive 
advantage, he notes, will be shared by other major economies in the Asian 
region, whether it is Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia in Southeast 
Asia, or the Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Iran. 
He also argues that the future (relating international trade and development) 
will be China-centric as China holds the midpoint of the Silk Road both at land 
snd in the ocean. China can also reap the benefit of having some 
internationally top-rated ports – land, sea, or air.  
The second BRI International Forum held in Beijing in April 2019 
hosted 37 Heads of the States or Governments, including Russian president 
Vladimir Putin, Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte, UK chancellor Philip 
Hammond, Pakistan’s prime minister Imran Khan and the heads of state of the 
10 ASEAN (Association of South-east Asian Nation) states (Kuo, 2019). The 
US was reportedly sending low-level delegates, while notably India and 
Turkey did not attend at all. As Singh (2019) notes that India remains cautious 
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of the project and has never expressed its support.  Several reports questioned 
the success of the summit, referring to the denial of participation by a few 
crucial state-parties. However, the summit significantly delivers several 
important deals (worth 64 billion US dollars) and, with projected agreements. 
What was noticeable is that among those 37 Heads of the States, most of the 
leaders were either Military-backed or autocratic. Among these 37 leaders, 
only two were females – Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, and 
Nepal’s President Bidhya Devi Bhandari. Both countries did have close ties 
with India. As India was not attending in protest of building the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China was happy to have Myanmar, 
Nepal, and Pakistan (Aneja, 2019). Bangladesh, another South Asian nation, 
is still in the project, although its presence has not been evident in recent times.  
The African countries have always been interested in BRI as the 
governments across the continent see a high potential of trade and 
infrastructure development partnerships. We can notice two points here – first, 
China has started various kinds of infrastructure projects since the 1990s in 
different African countries and has invested heavily and ten times more than 
the US (Davis, 2018). Second, most undemocratic African nations have a great 
affiliation with China since the Chinese loans are easy to get in comparison to 
the US ones, which come with a set of conditions, especially regarding 
democratic practices. As Breuer (2017) describes, almost two-thirds of 
Africans said China’s influence was ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ positive, while only 
15% saw it as somewhat/very negative. The factors which contributed most to 
a positive image of China are the cheap Chinese products as well as China’s 
business and infrastructure investments. China has capitalized on this positive 
image in Africa and started to build several seaports across the continent.  
The interests of European countries in BRI are apparent. The proposed 
belt will allow Europe to import goods from China and export items to the 
countries in Asia. The direct participation of Italy, the UK, Switzerland, and 
several East European countries have enhanced the credibility of the project. 
During President Xi’s state visit to Italy in March 2019, several agreements 
and deals were signed as part of BRI (BBC, 2019). These developments have 
left the USA with concerns about China’s attitude towards the implementation 
of BRI, calling it a predatory investment. Hurley, Morris, & Portelance (2018) 
studied the concerns of risks in and around BRI, as well as the so-called ‘debt 
traps’ and raised a question about the sustainability of the debts and loans. The 
United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and his team joined the 
BRI Summit in April 2019 and expressed UN’s concerns over the lack of 
transparency and openness of the initiative as asked for more accountability 
(UN, 2019).  
Drawing from this criticism, we need to recognize some drawbacks of 
BRI. Firstly, although Russia participated in the second BRI International 
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Forum actively, the country immediately demanded the share of the idea and 
vision as an ally, not just as a business partner (Dasgupta, 2019). Yasmin 
(2018) states that the international system revolves around the concept of 
power. The existing world system is based on the Westphalian sovereignty, 
where the primacy of national interests determines state actions. China sees 
itself as a soft superpower in the Asian region, and the countries capitalized 
on their demographic and geographic advantage through Chinese initiatives, 
she added. Chance and Mafinezam (2016) studied the concerns and 
possibilities of US-China cooperation through BRI and found two significant 
issues.  
‘Firstly, BRI is largely regarded among American experts to be a 
seriously pursued initiative with the potential to significantly impact 
the economic and political future of Eurasia. However, the overall 
response to BRI has been ambivalent, with Americans expressing 
frequent concerns about standards, the adequacy of Chinese 
development practices, and the erosion of Western development 
norms. Secondly, Geopolitical concerns significantly frame 
Americans’ views of BRI. The initiative is sometimes viewed a 
deliberate attempt to economically marginalize the United States, to 
create a Eurasian sphere of influence, or as a pretext for expanding 
China’s overseas military presence. At the very least, perceptions that 
China is embarking on a new, “assertive” phase of statecraft elevate 
the scrutiny BRI faces.’ (Mafinezam, 2016 p. 1) 
 
Hence, the geopolitical interests of China and other participating 
countries are mutually inclusive and complimentary. At the same time, the 
concerns of the USA point towards the aggressive investment plans and 
initiatives from the current Chinese regime. It indicates that China’s 
emergence as a global sea and land power through the BRI pose threats to US 
dominance in the current world order, especially with the leadership of 
President Xi Jinping. 
 
6.  BRI Institutions: promising and cooperative 
The institutions related to BRI can be divided into three major areas – 
(a) international financial institutions, (b) public institutions, and (c) private 
companies. In addition to that, the BRI project is itself a revival attempt of an 
old institution of trade and commerce. However, as part of the political 
economy analysis, this work investigates the formal and informal institutions 
affiliated with power and interests within BRI as a global initiative. Callahan 
(2016) notes that since the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
Silk Road Fund provide action with 150 billion US dollars, these two 
institutions will play a vital role in investments in Asian developing countries. 
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Having 97 member countries, AIIB could emerge as a potential contender to 
the World Bank and IMF. Khanna (2018) shows how, as a finance, trade, and 
investment alliance, AIIB has complemented with other Asian trading nations 
and created a mutually benefiting environment in the region. Shahriar et al. 
(2018) conducted a systematic review of the literature dealing with the 
institutional mechanism of BRI and examined AIIB, Silk Road, and the six 
economic corridors in their paper. They came up with two critical 
observations. First, the volume of foreign direct investments increased in the 
BRI countries since they participated in this initiative. This development 
indicates that the growth and development through BRI may boost the host 
countries. Second, to deliver the objectives in the economic corridors, China 
must take effective diplomatic measures to resolve the issues of peripheral 
conflicts and confrontations in some countries, especially in South Asia. For 
instance, we can discuss the case of CPEC here. The economy of Pakistan is 
not in perfect health and according to the statement of Prime Minister Imran 
Khan, Chinese investments and loans came as a rescuer for the Pakistan 
economy (Rana, 2019). However, due to China’s substantial engagement in 
CPEC, India has withdrawn itself from BRI stating that the corridor is a threat 
to the sovereign lands of India (Rana K. S., 2020). In the backdrop of these 
developments, the Rohingya refugee crisis remains the most critical problem 
in the region.  
These financial institutions in the coming days will play a vital role in 
building alliances between Chinese state-owned companies and private and 
public entities across BRI countries. The big concern for these supportive 
measures that some countries will not be able to pay back their loans and may 
need to provide some political and geographical leverages to China. The 
question of transparency and accountability remains at the core of the 
institutional mechanism inside BRI. However, the official website of BRI 
publishes documents (bilateral agreements, multilateral documents, MoUs, 
news, and research publications) regularly which will provide the participating 
and other potential members with confidence and hope. 
 
7.  Implications for Global Politics and Development 
As Khanna (2018) argued, if the 19th century has been the era of 
Europeanization, the 20th century has all been about Americanization, the 21st 
century will be a story of Asianization. To him, China will be at the center of 
international trade, investment, and business in the coming days. As shown in 
the following image (Khanna, 2016), the number of countries for which China 
is the largest trade partner is more than double that of the USA. The image 
also shows how international trading tends to find its center in Eurasia, not 
anywhere else. Therefore, BRI, if successful, will become the most beneficiary 
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multilateral project for many countries not only in Asia but also for other parts 
of the world, including Europe and Africa. 
 
Figure 3: Countries for which China and the USA are the largest trading partner  
(Khanna, 2018) 
 
Shahriar et al. (2018) state that as more than 65 countries have united 
within the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has emerged as a 
global institution itself. They added, “China’s BRI is driven towards the 
following goals: a) to accelerate China’s economic development, b) to build 
up China’s international image, and c) to lead the world through the 
combinations and connectedness of trade facilitation, cross-border integration, 
and communications” (p. 9). China’s rise as a super soft and power both on 
land and sea seems to be inevitable through BRI, especially in the context of 
western powers’ current role in the global order. 
In the American continent, the USA is the only global political and 
economic power. In Europe, the United Kingdom is suffering from its politics 
around Brexit. Germany and France have shown their interests in joining 
China’s BRI and stated during EU-China Summit 2019 that the two sides 
would enhance communication within the framework of the EU-China 
Connectivity Platform. Italy has already joined BRI while Switzerland, 
Austria, and Hungry are also willing to have partnerships. In the Southeast 
Asian region, major countries, including Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Myanmar, have already joined the project. In South Asia, 
Pakistan and Nepal have active roles in BRI. From West Asia, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran have joined, and almost all countries of Central Asia have 
participated. Several African countries, including Egypt, have already signed 
several projects under BRI. Russia has been one of the leading countries in the 
project as well. The East Asian countries like Japan and Korea are actively 
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considering to be connected. So, in a word, through BRI, China has 
successfully touched upon almost all continental lands and seas. It can be 
argued that the six economic corridors and the maritime silk route, if realized, 
will give China unprecedented geopolitical leverage.  
It is noteworthy that China has started many of their construction 
works (highways, bridges, rail networks, and ports) in numerous countries 
since 1997, after the Asian Financial Crisis. China was looking at new markets 
and new demands actively. China, in other words, was playing Chess 
(regarding thinking well ahead) while other superpowers led by the USA were 
busy in fighting terrorists in West Asia. Since Donald Trump came in power 
with the ‘American First’ policy, China has had the playground empty. As 
Mahbubani (2018) argued that the West has failed to understand China; the 
West thought China had been ruled by the same Communist Party of China 
(CPC), but they did not realize that China has undergone many changes and 
revitalizations. He also argued that the West could no longer presume to 
impose its ideology on the world, and more crucially, they must stop seeking 
to intervene, politically and militarily, in the affairs of other nations. The 
liberal democratic world order led by the USA is also under decline as the 
western democratic institutions, including the US general election, has been 
under the question of credibility and objectivity. The authoritative nature of 
democratic regimes across the world (the USA, France, and India) have also 
damaged the image of liberal democracy as an ideology in the world. As a 
result, many countries now intend to join the Chinese bloc of global politics 
and development. The recent US ban on Huawei, followed by Google Android 
sanction, also raised the question on the dependency on the USA as a trading 
partner (Brandom, 22 May 2019). Although the trade war is damaging the 
Chinese dominance in the IT market, it mostly damages the image of the USA. 
Thus, the USA is facilitating the emergence of China in this context of the Belt 
and Road initiative.   
 
8. Conclusions: no end of history 
Fukuyama in 1989 claimed that, “What we may be witnessing is not 
just the end of the Cold War or the passing of a particular period of post-war 
history, but the end of history as such; that is, the endpoint of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.” Considering the above account of 
stories and pieces of evidence in the context of BRI, we can recognize that 
with the emergence of China as a global superpower and as a practitioner of 
socialism with its unique characteristics, the ideological war with the West 
seems to regain its momentum once again. In the era of the rise of populist 
leaders, especially Donald Trump, the liberal order led by the West fail to 
adapt to the global changes. The United States, the United Kingdom, India, 
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and several other democratic world powers are mostly busy with their 
domestic problems. Liberal democracy as an ideology, seems to have lost 
footing in the world order. The ongoing trade war between the USA and China 
is less about global trade, but more about their national interests. Although the 
USA is still the only military superpower with hundreds of military posts 
around the world, it does not seem to influence the world. In contrast, China’s 
BRI has raised hope and business among the developing and developed 
nations, and China seems to see its journey as a superpower within its reach, 
well within the year of 2049, the centenary of the formation of PRC. If BRI 
gets pace in the next decade, China will undoubtedly be the center of global 
politics and development. The USA will have to reinvent its policies and find 
new strategies if it wants to cease the Chinese rise and expansion. 
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